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U.S. Sugar Policy: Domestic and
International Repercussions of Sour Law
By KATHERINE E. MONAHAN*
Member of the Class of 1992
I. INTRODUCTION
"Rarely has one small program been so bad on so many different
levels."
Representative Thomas J. Downey, July 1990.1
The United States sugar program is one of the Government's least
known and most highly criticized policies. The primary instruments of
the program, sugar import restrictions imposed by the President and do-
mestic sugar price supports established by Congress, have long been at-
tacked as contrary to both domestic and international interests. Yet
despite the highest level of both domestic and international criticism in
the history of the present policy,2 President Bush and the U.S. Congress
each recently gave new life to the embattled program. By changing the
U.S. method of restricting foreign sugar imports from a system of abso-
lute quotas to a two-tiered tariff system in September 1990, President
Bush narrowly circumvented a previously broken rule of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),3 leaving the total level of im-
* B.S.F.S., Georgetown University, 1987. The author would like to thank: Dale Mc-
Neil, Esq., of the United States Department of Agriculture for unselfishly giving up his hours
on the airplane to and from Geneva to review technical aspects of this Note; Robert 0. Nagel,
Esq., for his invaluable resources and insights concerning the industry's perspective; and most
importantly her father, Thomas R. Monahan, for never denying her the right to argue and for
introducing her to sugar.
The ideas expressed herein as well as any factual inaccuracies are those of the author, do
not represent and may in fact conflict with the opinions and beliefs of those who assisted with
early drafts of this Note.
1. Quoted in Christopher Madison, Raising Hell on Cane, NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 14,
1990, at 1717.
2. The present policy is defined as the post-1981/82 U.S. sugar program. The height-
ened level of criticism since the 1985 farm bill may be due to worsening economic conditions
and tightening sugar import quotas. Previous U.S. sugar policies have also been subject to
criticism, notably those in place during 1890, 1941-45 and 1974.
3. A June 1989 GATT panel ruling found the former U.S. system in violation of its rules.
United States Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, GATT Doc. L/6514 (Basic Instruments and
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ports virtually unchanged.4 Then, in November 1990, Congress passed
the 1990 Farm Bill,' which extended the price support component of the
sugar program another five years.6 The new legislation maintains the
record high 1986-90 support level for sugarcane7 and effectively increases
the support level for beet sugar.8 The only significant change in the sugar
program under the 1990 legislation was the addition of a "standby" mar-
keting allotment program. 9 But the program will go into effect only at
some future date if and when the total allocation for foreign imports falls
below 1.25 million short tons.10 As the Uruguay Roumd of multilateral
trade negotiations under the GATT'I winds to a close, it is time to take a
hard look at the United States sugar program, the criticism it has re-
ceived, and why, despite that criticism, it has been revitalized year after
year.
The current United States sugar program has evoked strong domes-
tic and international opposition since its inception. 12  Critics 13 argue
against the program on several fronts. They claim the protectionist pol-
icy gouges consumers and exports U.S. jobs in the sugar-containing
Selected Documents (BISD) (36th Supp.) 331) (1989) [hereinafter GATT Panel Report
(1989)]. See infra text accompanying notes 213-30.
4. Proclamation No. 6179, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (1990).
5. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, known as the 1990
Farm Bill, was signed into law November 28, 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359
[hereinafter 1990 Farm Bill]. The sugar price support provisions, id. §§ 901-903 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1446(a), (g), 1359aa-1359j, 1446(h), 1425(a)), went into effect the first
day of the 1991 crop year, July 1, 1991. Id. § 1171(a) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1421
note (Supp. 11 1990)).
6. The Senate report on its version of the Farm Bill stated that the price support provi-
sion of the new sugar title was "basically an extension of the existing program for sugar for the
marketing years 1991 through 1995." S. REP. No. 357, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1990); 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4792. The Senate version was adopted by the Conference Committee.
7. See infra note 39.
8. See infra note 38.
9. 1990 Farm Bill § 902, 104 Stat. at 3479-548.
10. Without some new mechanism to limit the domestically produced sugar supply, even
a zero import level would not have sufficiently restricted the sugar supply on the U.S. market
to maintain sugar prices at the support level required by law under Section 902(a) of Title IX
of the Food Security Act of 1985, 99 Stat. 1443. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
11. The Uruguay Round is the eighth round of multilateral trade talks sponsored by the
GATT. For a general discussion of the GATT, see infra notes 181-212 and accompanying
text.
12. See generally U.S. Sugar Policy, Implications for International Trade and Options for
Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings (Feb. 1990)].
13. The policy has a broad spectrum of critics from sugar refiners to Ralph Nader. Sena-
tor Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), co-author of the Senate Bill to reduce the sugar loan rate, is one of
the program's more outspoken critics in the Senate. See House Rejects Proposals to Cut Sup-
port Price for U.S. Sugar, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A-20 (July 25, 1990).
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goods industries by artificially sustaining a U.S. domestic sugar price that
is, at times, double or triple the world market price;"' blatantly contra-
dicts the primary U.S. foreign trade goal of global market liberalization
and; undermines foreign assistance programs designed to economically
aid Third World sugar producers by curtailing their U.S.-bound exports.
But proponents argue that without the support of the sugar program,
U.S. sugarcane and beet producers could not survive in the face of heav-
ily subsidized sugar exports from the European Community. 5 Thus, the
sugar policy debate continues.
This Note will address many unanswered questions regarding a little
known program that has drastic repercussions in the U.S. and abroad.
First, it will describe the United States sugar program itself and explain
the adverse effects of the policy on U.S. consumers. Next, it will explain
how the program undermines U.S. trade and foreign policy goals. Fi-
nally, it will explain the roadblocks that must be overcome to bring U.S.
sugar policy more in line with U.S. domestic and international policy
objectives.
A. History of the Sugar Program
U.S. sugar policies date back to July 4, 1789, when the first sugar
tariff was implemented as a revenue raising measure.16 Since that time,
the U.S. sugar market has been free from import duties during only a few
brief periods 7 between 1890 and 1894.' s In the two centuries since the
14. Because the world market is a residual market which accounts for less than 20% of
world sugar production, it does not reflect a true free market world sugar price. However,
analysts agree that the present U.S. domestic sugar price is clearly above what a free world
price would be. See Review of General Accounting Office Report "Sugar Program: Issues Re-
lated to Imports of Sugar-Containing Products" and Impact on the US Sugar Program: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Cotton, Rice, and Sugar of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 72 n.2 (1988) (statement of Brian P. Crowley, Senior Associate Director, Re-
sources, Community and Economic Development Division, U.S. General Accounting Office)
[hereinafter Hearings (June 1988)].
15. Since 1978, the elaborate mechanisms of the U.S. sugar program have included a
10.45 cents/lb. countervailing duty on E.C. sugar, which presently expels most F-C. sugar
from the U.S. market.
16. Tariff Act of 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24. Import duties and domestic excise taxes were the
major sources of government revenue at the time. Sugar revenues accounted for 20% of all
import duties. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., THE
UNIrED STATES SUGAR PROGRAM 30 (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter HousE COMM. ON
AGRICULTURE].
17. U.S. sugar trade was also virtually free in the 1974, 1975, and 1976 crop years and
between October 1979 and September 1981 when, because of relatively high world prices, im-
port restrictions beyond a low tariff were deemed unnecessary. R. STURGISS ET AL., 1990 AND
U.S. SUGAR POLICY REFORM 7-8 (1990) [hereinafter STURGISS].
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first sugar tariff, the rationale for the U.S. policy 19 has changed from
revenue raising to protectionism.20 The U.S. sugar program is no longer a
significant source of revenue.21 It appears that the limited objective of
present U.S. sugar policy 22 is to guarantee an enhanced income for do-
23mestic producers and processors.
B. Present Sugar Policy
The U.S. sugar program is not administered under one comprehen-
sive statute. Instead, it is orchestrated through many acts of Congress
and numerous Presidential Proclamations, drafted over several years,
and subject to an unending string of modifications and amendments.
These laws are implemented by the President under the auspices of sev-
eral executive agencies, most notably the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA). Five provisions of U.S. law form the basis of the present sugar
program: 1) Section 206 of the Agricultural Act of 19-49 (the 1949 Act)
as amended by the 1990 Farm Bill (section 206);24 2) Section 902 of the
Food Security Act of 1985, as amended by the 1990 Farm Bill;25 3) addi-
tional notes 2 and 3 to chapter 17 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
18. In 1890 the revenue duty was repealed and replaced until 1894, by a domestic
"bounty." HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 30.
19. Federal Control of the domestic sugar industry began in 1917 with the Food Control
Act. Import quotas were imposed under the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934 and the Sugar Acts of
1937 and 1948 (which expired December 31, 1974).
20. The protectionist rationale first appeared in 1894 when the bounty was replaced by a
tariff until 1934. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. SUGAR POLICY: AN ANALYSIS 1 (Ralph Ives & John Hurley eds., 1988) [hereinaf-
ter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE].
21. Duties on sugar imported within a country's allocated quota are nominal and very
little sugar will come in under the higher second tier duty. See infra notes 97-98. Further-
more, any import duty revenues do not compare to the cost of the program paid by those who
buy artificially high-priced U.S. sugar and sugar-containing products.
22. The U.S. Congress has noted "the policy of the U.S. Government-for defense and
strategic reasons-to preserve within the United States the ability to produce a substantial
portion of our sugar requirements" because "sugar is an essential and vital food product
needed by American consumers .... The argument is strikingly similar to that scoffed at by
American negotiators in the GATT rounds when introduced in support of Japan's protection
of its rice farmers. HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 28.
23. By maintaining stable prices and protectifig U.S. producers from foreign competition,
the program acts as an insurance policy, guaranteeing that growers and processors can pro-
duce sugar at no risk. No other farm group is afforded such absolute security, at the expense
of so many.
24. Agricultural Act of 1949, sec. 901, § 206, 104 Stat. 3359, 3478-79 (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 1446(g) [hereinafter Section 206].
25. The Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 902, 99 Stat. 1354, 1443-45, as
amended by 1990 Farm Bill 104 Stat. 3359, 3488 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1446 note (Supp. II
1990)) [hereinafter Section 902].
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(HTS), known as the "Headnote Authority;" 6 4) Section 22 of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1933;27 and 5) Part VII of subtitle B of title
III of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as added by the 1990
Farm Bill.28
Section 206 requires the USDA to support the price of domestically
grown sugarcane and sugar beets through nonrecourse loans. Under the
current loan program introduced in 1981,29 the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration30 provides nonrecourse loans31 to sugar processors32 at a set
loan rate.33 To qualify for a loan,34 processors must pledge sugar as col-
lateral and agree to pay producers a minimum support price.3 1 The Sec-
retary of Agriculture is required by law to support the price of sugarcane
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1202. The Headnote Authority is contained in both the U.S. Schedule of
GATT concessions (schedule XX (U.S.)) and the domestic tariff schedule. Additional U.S.
notes 2 and 3 to chapter 17 of the HITS are contained in Title I of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46
Stat. 590, as amended by section 1204(a) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1204, 102 Stat. 1107, 1148-50.
27. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1988))
[hereinafter Section 22].
28. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,7 U.S.C. § 1359, as amended by 1990 Farm Bill
§ 902, 104 Stat. 3359, 3479-88 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1359aa-1359jj (Supp. 111990)) [herein-
after Part VII].
29. On December 22, 1981, Congress enacted a price support program for sugar as part of
the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98,95 Stat. 1213, 1257 (1981). The Act
amended Title II of the Agricultural Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. § 1446(h), to require the Secretary
of Agriculture to establish a price support purchase program, effective immediately, and a loan
program effective for the 1982 through 1985 crop years.
30. The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is a U.S. government agency within the
USDA. It was established to stabilize, support, and protect farm income and prices, assist in
the maintenance of balanced and adequate supplies of agricultural commodities and facilitate
the orderly distribution of agricultural commodities. See Commodity Credit Corporation
Charter Act of June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1070, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 714).
31. U.S. federal farm assistance programs generally provide "nonrecourse" loans, secured
by the farmer's crop. The nonrecourse aspect bars the lender (the CCC) from any action
against the farmer if the value of the security (his crop) falls below the amount required to
repay the loan.
32. Unlike other commodity programs, sugar loans are made to processors rather than
directly to producers. This is because, unlike other commodities, sugarcane and sugar beets
must be processed before they can be stored. LANDELL MILLS COMMODITIES STUDIES, THE
U.S. SUGAR PROGRAM BEYOND 1990: THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE PoLICY SCENARIOS 1-
3 (1990) [hereinafter LANDEL. MILLS (1990)].
33. The USDA establishes loan rates region by region depending on freight costs to the
major consuming areas. Id
34. 7 C.F.R. § 1435 (1991). Regulations necessary for CCC implementation of the sugar
price support loan program established under Title IX of the 1990 Farm Bill were adopted
under the authority of section 401(e)(2) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. § 1421(eX2);
5 U.S.C. § 301; 7 U.S.C. § 1446; and 15 U.S.C. § 714.
35. Support prices depend on the respective loan rates which vary region to region, but
farmers generally receive about 60% of the proceeds of the sugar loan or sale while processors
receive the remainder. LANDELL MILLS (1990), supra note 32, at 1-3.
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at a level not less than eighteen cents per pound raw value36 and the price
of beet sugar at a higher level3 7 calculated yearly.3, Thus, contracts be-
tween producers and processors necessarily reflect this statutory mini-
mum support level.39 In November 1990, Congress approved a farm bill
that would maintain the 1986-90 eighteen cent per pound price support
level for raw cane sugar for the next five years and effectively increase the
support level for sugar beets."
Section 902 of the 1985 Food Security Act4" requires the President
to use all available authorities to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to
operate the sugar program at "no cost" to the Government.42 In order to
comply with the "no cost" requirement, the USDA ensures that the do-
mestic sugar price is maintained at a level high enough to guarantee
sugar processors an adequate incentive to repay their federal loans. This
goal is achieved by limiting the supply of imported sugar in the domestic
market.43 This, in turn, drives up domestic sugar prices to a level at
which processors can afford to pay back their federal loans and the Gov-
ernment is not obliged to acquire forfeited sugar.44
Prior to 1990, the USDA set an annual target minimum domestic
market price level for raw sugar below which there was a risk that sugar
would be forfeited to the CCC. This indicator price was known as the
36. 1990 Farm Bill, supra note 5, sec. 901, § 206(b), (c).
37. Beet and cane sugar go through very distinct refining processes. Beet sugar is more
costly at the support price stage because it is closer to a refined form.
38. The 1991-92 beet rate was set at 22.85 cents per pound. 7 C.F.R. § 1435.4(b)(1991).
This is up from the 20.34 cent beet rate (113% of the 18 cent sugarcane rate) under the 1986-
90 program. See 1990 Farm Bill, supra note 5, sec. 901, § 206(c). ("[T]he Secretary shall
support the price of each of the 1991 through 1995 crops of domestically grown sugar beets
through nonrecourse loans at such level for each crop as the Secretary determines reflects
(1) an amount that bears the same relation to the support level for the crop of sugarcane... as
the weighted average of producer returns for sugar cane. . . , for the most recent 5-year period
for which data are available; plus (2) an amount that covers sugar beet processor fixed market-
ing expenses.")
39. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 56.
40. 1990 Farm Bill, supra note 5, sec. 901, § 206. See also S. REs. No. 2830, 101st Cong.
2d Sess. (1990) and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 916, 101st Cong., 2d Sess, 761, 826-835 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C. § C.A.N. 5286, 5351-5360.
41. 1985 Food Security Act § 902, 99 Stat. at 1443.
42. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conferece stated the purpose
of Section 902(a): "that the quota be adjusted to the level necessary to ensure that there are no
forfeitures and thus no cost to the government." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 447, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. 325, 390, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2251, 2316.
43. The domestic sugar supply is limited by means of import restrictions imposed under
the Headnote Authority explained infra notes 50-56, and accompanying text.
44. Guy Gugliotta, Sweetening U.S. Sugar Policies: An Ingrained Program, WASH. POST,
July 16, 1990, at Al.
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"Market Stabilization Price" (MSP).45 The MSP was calculated by ad-
ding together the loan rate or price support level, interest costs on the
loan, transportation costs, and an additional incentive to induce proces-
sors to market rather than forfeit the sugar." A U.S. domestic sugar
price at or above the MSP level47 would guarantee U.S. processors mar-
ket returns sufficient to cover their costs and repay their government
loans." The system of limiting imports such that the domestic sugar
supply is low enough to drive domestic sugar prices up to a level never
less than the MSP has assured compliance with the no cost provision of
the 1985 Act, effectively precluding forfeiture on sugar loans since 1985.
Theoretically, the sugar program is thereby maintained at no cost to the
Government.49
The Headnote Authority5 0 authorizes the President to limit the
amount of foreign-produced raw and refined sugar entering the U.S. by
imposing duties, limited by a quota, on imported sugars, syrups and mo-
lasses."' The U.S. system of limiting imports of foreign sugar has been
administered under the Headnote Authority since 1974.52 However, the
45. The MSP was originally established to determine bond requirements and maximum
liabilities in connection with the Section 22 re-export program, see 7 CF.R. § 6.300 (1990), but
became a de facto target price level for the sugar program. Telephone interview with Ron
Lord, Agricultural Economist, Economic Research Service, USDA (Jan. 30, 1991). As of
1991, a MSP benchmark figure has not been used as a de facto target price. Instead, separate
loan forteiture price levels are calculated for each of the various beet and cane regions to use as
guidelines in establishing the import quota levels. Telephone interview with Cleveland Marsh,
Team Leader, Import Quota Programs, Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), USDA (Sept. 13,
1991).
46. Set annually on October 1, the MSP was defined in 7 CF.R. §§ 6.300-6.302 (1990).
47. The 1989-90 MSP was 21.95 cents per pound. LANDELL MILLS (1990), supra note
32, at 1-7.
48. Although the USDA has attempted to set import quotas so as to keep the domestic
price (New York Number 14 contract) close to the MSP, such use of quotas has not been
wholly successful Id. This may be one factor that prompted the abandonment of the MSP
benchmark.
49. But consumers pay the price of the sugar program. As a result of the price support
system, the U.S. domestic price of sugar is well above the world price. In the first half of 1991,
the average world price for raw sugar was 8.7 cents per pound while U.S. refiners paid just
over 21 cents. USDA, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE (ERS), SUGAR AND SWEETENER- SIT-
UATION AND OUTLOOK REPORT 8, 12 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter SUGAR AND SWEETENER
(1991)].
50. See supra note 26.
51. Id. Headnote 2 provides that the President shall modify the duties and quotas appli-
cable to sugar imports whenever such modifications are necessary to "give due consideration to
the interests in the United States sugar market of domestic producers and materially affected
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."
52. Upon expiration of the Sugar Act of 1948 in 1974, Headnote 2 required the President
to proclaim a rate of duty and a quota if he found that such duty and quota would give due
consideration to the interests in the U.S. sugar market of domestic producers and materially
1992]
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quota amount was not reduced to a restrictive level until 1982 when de-
clining world sugar prices threatened to cause massive loan forfeitures by
U.S. processors.5" In response to what was perceived as an emergency
situation, President Reagan introduced an "Emergency Quota Pro-
gram,"54 which amended Headnote 3 to severely limit sugar imports 5
and set country-by-country import quotas.
56
The Emergency Quota Program, established by Presidential Procla-
mation 4914, was immediately challenged in court by Ihe U.S. Cane Re-
finers' Association.57 In US. Cane Sugar Refiners'Association v. Block,58
plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that because the President may impose fees
or quotas, but not both fees and quotas under the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1933,59 the new quota could not be lawfully imposed while
import fees on sugar were in effect under section 22 of the 1933 Act.
Section 22, they claimed, was the only statute authorizing the President
to restrict imports for the purpose of protecting pice support pro-
grams.6" In granting the Government's motion for summary judgment,
the court held6" that the President's authority to impose quotas on sugar
imports under the Trade Expansion Act of 196262 was complementary
to, and not in conflict with, his authority to impose quotas pursuant to
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.63 Therefore, section 201 of the
Trade Expansion Act, in conformity with Headnote 2, provided the Pres-
affected contracting parties to the GATT. On November 16, 1974, President Gerald R. Ford
introduced Headnote 3 which set a duty and an absolute sugar import quota of 7,000,000 short
tons raw value. The quota was non-restrictive because it exceeded the pre-1975 yearly volume
of sugar imports. Proclamation No. 4334, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,739 (1974).
53. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 10.
54. Proclamation No. 4941, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,661 (1982) [hereinafter Proclamation No.
4941]. The program was promulgated under the authority of Section 201 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1821, and in conformity with Headnote 2 of subpart A of part 10
of schedule 1 of the TSUS.
55. The Proclamation limited total imports to 220,000 short tons, raw value between May
11 and June 30, 1982 and thereafter by amounts determined by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Proclamation No. 4941.
56. The allocation of quotas among individual countries is generally based on their share
of the U.S. market during 1975-81 when imports were relatively unrestricted. USDA, ERS,
SUGAR AND SWEETENER OUTLOOK REPORT 10-11 (Sept. 1990).
57. The Association was comprised of the six major independent U S. cane sugar refiners.
In addition, two major trade associations, the U.S. Sugar Cane and Sugar Beet Producers and
the U.S. First Processors of Sugar, filed amicus curiae briefs.
58. 544 F. Supp. 883 (1982).
59. Id. at 891 (citing U.S. v. Best Foods, Inc., 47 C.C.P.A. 163, C.A.D. 751 (1960)).
60. Id. at 893.
61. Id. at 894.
62. 19 U.S.C. § 1821.
63. 7 U.S.C. § 624.
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ident with authority for imposing quotas independent of his authority
under section 22." The court cited the Senate Finance Committee's rec-
ognition of the dual system of sugar import control under both section 22
and Headnote 2.65 The court also found 4941 quotas consistent with the
GATT and the International Sugar Agreement." On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed the lower court's find-
ings, 67 stating that "[t]he President's action being authorized by [section
201 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962], his motives, his reasoning, his
findings of facts requiring the action, and his judgment, are immune from
judicial scrutiny."
61
While the authority of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 193369 is not presently used to restrict imports of raw sugar, it is
used to limit entry of sugar in other forms.7" Under section 22 the Presi-
dent may, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture, im-
pose fees7' or quantitative limitations on any imported article that
"materially interfere[s]" with "any loan, purchase, or other program or
operation undertaken by the Department of Agriculture, or any agency
operating under its direction."7 2 Section 22 fees may not exceed fifty
percent ad valorem. They are applied in addition to the ordinary customs
duties provided for in the HTS, and are applicable even to products im-
ported duty-free.7'
Section 22 became a major instrument of U.S. sugar policy when
U.S. sugar interests became concerned that foreign imports of sugar-con-
taining goods began to shrink the domestic market for sugar. They de-
clared that foreign sugar producers were circumventing U.S. import
quotas by exporting their sugar to the U.S. in the form of sugar-contain-
ing goods. In 1983 President Reagan determined that present import
limits on raw and refined sugar were insufficient to maintain the mini-
64. Id
65. S. REP. No. 644, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (March 26, 1980) (report on the bill which
became the International Sugar Agreement, 1977, Implementation Act, 7 U.S.C. § 624).
66. U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 544 F. Supp. 883, 895 (1982).
67. U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399 (1982).
68. Id at 404 (citing U.S. v. George S. Bush and Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 371 (1939)).
69. 7 U.S.C. § 624.
70. Measures taken under Section 22 include quotas on products containing a high per-
centage of sugar and a one cent per pound import fee on refined sugar and certain articles
containing soluble non-sugar solids.
71. 7 U.S.C. § 624(b).
72. Id
73. Section 22(c) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 provides that "such fees
shall be treated for administrative purposes... as duties imposed by the TariffAct of 1930, but
such fees shall not be considered as duties for the purpose of granting any preferential treat-
ment under any international obligation of the United States." 7 U.S.C. § 624(c).
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mum domestic price necessary to avoid loan forfeiture; imports of sugar-
containing products would also have to be limited.74 Thus, to comple-
ment the headnote quota on raw and refined sugar, a quota of zero quan-
tity75 was declared on certain sugar mixtures and blends. 6 This new
quota was established under the authority of section 22. Approximately
two years later annual import quotas were imposed on items containing
more than ten percent cane or beet sugar by dry weight, including sweet-
ened cocoa, iced-tea mixes, and pancake mixes.77
By limiting the sugar supply available on the U.S. market, section 22
fees and quotas and the headnote tariff-rate quota provide the massive
protection necessary to maintain the domestic market price equal to or
above the wholesale level at which sugar processors would fail to repay
their federal loans and forfeit the sugar held as collateral. The forces of
protectionism have gained momentum with each new policy measure.
The basic policy of strictly limiting imports as a price support mecha-
nism has remained an integral part of the sugar program since 1982.78
As a result of increasingly restrictive quota allocations, annual im-
ports declined from slightly less than the average of 4.2 million tons in
1979-81 to about 1 million tons in 1988.11 Although the straight quota
became a tariff-rate quota in September 1990,80 the strategy of restricting
imports to shrink domestic supply and increase prices has remained
unchanged.
On September 27, 1991, the 1991-92 sugar tariff-rate import quota
amount" for October 1, 1991 through September 30, 1992 was set at
74. Proclamation No. 5071, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,089 (1983)[hereinafter Proclamation No.
5071]. See also Hearings (June 1988), supra note 14, at 24 (1988) (testimony of John Nuttall,
Chief, Sugar Group, FAS Hearings, USDA).
75. This was, in effect, an embargo.
76. Proclamation No. 5071, supra note 74.
77. Proclamations No. 5294, 50 Fed. Reg. 4187 (1985) and No. 53,40, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,881
(1985).
78. Although the U.S. has maintained sugar import quotas continuously since 1934, they
were first used as a mechanism to maintain artificially high domestic prices by restricting the
supply of sugar on the domestic market in 1982. A report by the USDA's Economic Research
Service stated the policy behind the provisions of the additional note 3(a) to chapter 17 of the
HTS as follows: "[s]ince May 1982, an annual import quota on sugar for domestic consump-
tion has been established on the basis of the balance between overall supply and demand, to
achieve U.S. price support objectives, and with 'due consideration' to materially affected con-
tracting parties to the [GAIT]." ERS, USDA, U.S. SUGAR STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM 8
(1991)(citing the language of the Headnote Authority).
79. Id.
80. Proclamation No. 6179, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (1990).
81. The tariff-rate import quota is the quantity of imported sugar permitted to enter the
U.S. at the lower, first-tier rate of duty.
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1,385,000 metric tons (1,526,701 short tons), 2 down 34 percent 3 from
the 1.9 million short ton quota of the year before."
Increasing domestic sugar production has taken a drastic toll on to-
tal foreign import allocations. A total 1981 import quota amount of
5,025,283 tons declined to 2,764,826 by 1990.85 The domestic produc-
tion increase is largely due to high sugar support prices that have in-
duced farmers to replace other crops with sugarcane or sugar beet. 6 As a
result, the percentage of the U.S. market"' left open to foreign imports
had declined from forty-seven percent of consumption in calendar 1970
to thirty-two percent in 1990.11
The form, but not the substance, of U.S. import protection was al-
tered by the Presidential Proclamation of September 13, 1990.89 On that
day, President Bush announced that the absolute import quota would be
replaced by a two-tiered tariff-rate quota system. The move was the
somewhat delayed response to a June 22, 1989 ruling by the Council of
the GATT9 that the U.S. sugar quota system violated GAIT rules.91
The new GATT-legal92 two-tiered tariff rate quota system allows quota
countries to export their allocated quota amounts at a "first tier" duty
82. SUGAR AND SWEETENER(1991) supra note 49, at 12. The total 1991-92 tariff rate
quota was among 40 countries including South Africa and Nicaragua.
83. Id.
84. USDA, ERS, SUGAR AND SWEETENER: SITUATION AND OUTLOOK REPORT 10
(Sept. 1990) [hereinafter SUGAR AND SWEETENER (1990)]. See also U.S: Raises Sugar Quota
for 1990-91, REUTER BUsINEsS REPORT, Sept. 14, 1990, available in LExIs, Nexis Ibrary,
Wires File.
85. USDA, ERS, SUGAR AND SWEETENER: SITUATION AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 69-
70 (1991) [hereinafter YEARBOOK].
86. The sugar program gave U.S. producers a strong incentive to expand output by pro-
viding guaranteed returns generally higher than other crops. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note
12, at 97 (statement of the Sugar Users Association).
87. Hearings (June 1988), supra note 14, at 72 (U.S. General Accounting Office Report
entitled "Sugar Program: Issues Related to Imports of Sugar-Containing Products"). U.S. per
capita sugar consumption has decreased as sugar's share of the U.S. sweetener market declined
due to increasing consumption of less expensive alternative sweeteners, principally high fruc-
tose corn syrup (HFCS).
88. USDA, ERS, U.S. SUGAR STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM 8 (1991) [hereinafter SUGAR
STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM].
89. Proclamation No. 6179, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (1990).
90. GATT Panel Report (1989), supra note 3. See also Bush Converts U.S Sugar Quota
Program to GATT-Legal Tariff-Rate Quota Scheme, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1431 (Sept.
19, 1990). See infra Section III for a description of the GAIT.
91. See infra notes 213-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the U.S. violation
and the GAT ruling.
92. Tariffs, but not quotas, are permitted under Article XI:1 of the GATT which forbids
all import or export "prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges."
GAT Panel Report (1989), supra note 3.
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rate of approximately 0.625 cents per pound raw value.9 3 Beneficiaries of
either the Generalized System of Preferences or the Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative pay no duty on their allocated quota amounts of sugar.94 But any
sugar entering the U.S. in excess of a country's allocated quota, or from a
country not allocated a share of the quota,95 is assessed the prohibitively
high duty of 16 cents per pound raw value.96 Because few raw or ordina-
rily refined sugar exporters will pay the prohibitively high97 second tier
import duty,98 the tariff-rate quota has an effect identical to that of the
absolute quota system it replaced; limiting U.S. sugar imports to set
country-by-country quotas and thereby limiting the supply of sugar on
the domestic market.
The 1990 Farm Bill amended the Agricultural Act of 193899 to pro-
vide for another mechanism to control domestic supply. The amend-
ment requires the establishment of a system of marketing controls on
domestic beet and cane sugar and crystalline fructose during any fiscal
year in which the Secretary estimatesc ° that imports of sugar for con-
sumption in the United States 0 1 will be less than 1.25 million short tons,
raw value. The marketing allotments would be imposed at a level that
93. SUGAR AND SWEETENER (1990), supra note 84 at 14.
94. Id. The first tier duty is equal to the general duty rate under the pre-1991 absolute
quota system. These import duties vary according to the polarity (sucrose content) of the
imported sugar. The 0.625 cents per pound duty rate applies to imported sugar testing 96%
polarity.
95. Exceptions have been made for countries with which the U.S. has free trade agree-
ments. Thus, there is no U.S. import quota on Canadian sugar which can enter duty free.
Mexican sugar may soon be granted similar status if the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) is successfully negotiated and ratified.
96. Proclamation No. 6179, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (1990).
97. At the current U.S. domestic price of approximately 22 cents per pound (based on the
September 1991 New York Number 14 contract price), a 16 cent import fee would leave for-
eign exporters 6 cents per pound, 3 cents less per pound that the current world price of approx-
imately 9 cents per pound (based on the September 1991 New York Number 11 contract
price).
98. Only the second tier sugar that has entered the U.S. since the two tiered tariff-rate
quota system took effect has been "specialty sugar" with such high market values that the 16
cent price differential was not a sufficient deterrant. Specialty sugars include the brown slab
sugar used in Chinese foods and specialty "rock candies."
99. 1990 Farm Bill, supra note 5, sec. 902.
100. Under the provision, the Secretary is required to make quarterly estimates of pro-
jected fiscal year imports by subtracting the quantity of domestically produced sugar and ex-
isting sugar stocks available for consumption in the U.S. from the estimated quantity to be
consumed in that year. 1990 Farm Bill, supra note 5, sec. 902, § 359b(a) (codified at 7 US.C.
§ 1359bb(a) (Supp. I 1990)).
101. Section 359j(c) of the 1938 Act as amended by the 1990 Farm Bill defines the United
States as "the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." 7
U.S.C. § 1359jj(c) (Supp. I1 1990).
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equals the fiscal year's U.S. consumption of sugar minus the combined
total of carry-in stocks and 1.25 million short tons, raw value. The pro-
vision would, in effect, set aside an approximately 1.25 million short ton
portion of the U.S. market for foreign sugar producers.
C. Recent Legislation
The debate over the 1990 Farm Bill"' 2 produced several proposals
for changes in U.S. sugar policy. In early 1989, Congress considered a
bill to establish the Sugar Stabilization Act, 113 which would have pro-
vided for a gradual reduction of the support price from eighteen to
twelve cents per pound over four years, and a more than 100 percent
increase in the import quota."1 4 But the bill was unsuccessful.
In 1990, a similar proposal introduced the Sugar Equity and Reform
Act.'0 5 The 1990 proposal called for: a five percent reduction of the pre-
vious year's support price over the crop years 1991-1995, effectively re-
ducing the eighteen cent support price to approximately fourteen cents
per pound;" 6 a 1995-96 MSP equal to the eighteen cents per pound 1990
support price;"07 and a minimum quota of one million metric tons for
1991, to increase by 250,000 per year until 1995.1°8 The Sugar Equity
and Reform Act gained more support than the 1989 bill, but was simi-
larly rejected. On July 24, 1990, an amendment to lower the eighteen
cents per pound price support level to sixteen cents per pound was de-
feated by a vote of 150-271 in the House. 9 And in October 1990, the
House and Senate approved the 1990 Farm Bill, extending the eighteen
cent price support level over the next five years, and leaving intact a rigid
system of foreign import allocations.110
102. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359.
103. Introduced to the House in February 1989 by Rep. Thomas Downey and Rep. Willis
Gradison and to the Senate March 1989 by Sen. Bill Bradley and Sen. Roth; H.R. 1055 and S.
552, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
104. Id
105. H.R. 4042, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990) (introduced to the House February 21, 1990
by Reps. Downey and Gradison).
106. Id
107. H.R. 4042, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990). Compare this with the 1989-90 MSP of
21.95 cents per pound. See LANDELL MILES 1990, supra note 32, at 1-7.
108. Id The proposal also included a provision for a tariff-rate quota system similar to
that implemented by President Bush in 1990. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
109. H.R. 3950, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
110. The bill passed the House October 23, 1990 and the Senate October 25, 1990. It was
signed into law November 28, 1990.
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II. DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS
A. A Sweet Policy for Whom? U.S. Sugar Policy and U.S. Sugar
Producers
Proponents of present sugar policy"' argue that U.S. producers
must be protected from the "wild swings of the international market"' 12
in order to maintain sugar supply security and price stability. Because
sugar is the only farm commodity of which the U.S. is a net importer,
they claim the U.S. is particularly vulnerable to foreign manipulation of
the sugar supply. They argue that U.S. sugar producers could not sur-
vive without support programs, especially in light of the policies of other
countries to subsidize their sugar producers and dump sugar on the
world market at artificially low prices.1 3
Although the number of U.S. cane and beet sugar producers is rela-
tively small, they are spread throughout several U.S. states and Puerto
Rico. Cane farming is concentrated in four states: Florida, Louisiana,
Hawaii, and Texas.' 14 Beets are grown in eight growing regions covering
fourteen states, with the bulk of production in Minnesota, California,
North Dakota, and Idaho.' A 1988 study by the U.S. Department of
Commerce found that the 12,600 U.S. sugar beet and sugarcane farms' 16
make up 0.6 percent of all U.S. farms and employ approximately 35,000
workers," 7 while the sugar processing industry employs another
8,000.118
California accounts for about sixteen percent of U.S. sugar beet pro-
I 11. For a discussion of groups which support the present sugar program see infra notes
316-33 and accompanying text.
112. House Rejects Proposals to Cut Support Price for U.S. Sugar, supra note 13, at A-20.
113. Id. The EC, for example, administers a three-tiered subsidy program for sugar produ.
cers, each tier representing a different sugar production category and receiving a different level
of support. The highest tier receives a 30 cents per pound subsidy. EC sugar subsidies totaled
about $2 billion in 1989. Subsidies have encouraged EC farmers to produce more and more
sugar. Since subsidies began, the EC has gone from a net sugar importer to a significant sugar
exporter. Gugliotta, supra note 44, at A-4.
114. S. REP. No. 357, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1990). In 1990 Florida growers ac-
counted for 55% of sugarcane production with Louisiana, Hawaii, and Texas producing 24, 18
and 3% respectively. ERS, USDA, U.S. STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM 2 (1991).
115. S. REP. No. 357. The leading four states accounted for 63% of sugar beet production
in 1990. SUGAR STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM supra note 88 at 4.
116. Sugar farms are relatively few in comparison to America's approximately 92,000 to-
bacco farms. 1987 statistic from the U.S. Bureau of Census, 1987 Census of Agriculture, vol. 1,
reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1990 STATISTICAL An-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 642, table no. 1111 (1990).
117. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 20.
118. Id. Another study found that the U.S. sweetener industry, presumably including not
only sugar but the widely used corn and noncaloric sweeteners, generates annual revenues of
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duction. I 19 The sugar beet industry contributed 318.8 million dollars to
the California economy in 1987 and provided 6,000 full-time jobs in
growing and harvesting in 1989.120 But in 1989, sugar ranked twenty-
seventh121 among all California commodities.1 2 In fact, according to the
USDA's Economic Research Service, even at the current price support
level, California sugar beets are only marginally competitive with several
alternative crops.123 Put in such perspective, the economic contributions
of sugar producers are relatively unimpressive.
In addition, the United States is an inefficient and high cost sugar
producer when compared to many Third World sugar exporting coun-
tries.124 U.S. growers claim their industry is one of the most efficient in
the world because of its high yields per acre."z But statistics show that
the U.S. falls near the middle in international cost comparison rank-
ings.' 26 The high U.S. output is apparently outweighed by the high cost
of sugar production.1 27 The fact that U.S. producers rank ahead of some
other countries in efficiency of production 2 8 seems to merely reflect the
even greater inefficiencies produced by the sugar subsidy programs of
those countries, most notably those of the European Community.
Members of Congress from sugar states argue that any decrease in
the support price would gravely affect farmers and entire communities in
sugar producing regions.' 29 Luther Markwart, President of the Ameri-
$7 billion and supports 361,000 jobs. Landell Mills Commodities Studies, HFC.S: annual sur-
vey of world production, in SWEErENER ANALYSIS 1-12 (1989).
119. YEARBOOK supra note 85, at 17. The 1990/91 figure is down from 30% in the early
1970s due to disease, drought, urbanization and competition from alternative crops. Id
120. Andrew Schmitz, U.S. Sugar and the California Sugar Industry, at v (Apr. 1990)
(unpublished report, on fie with the HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L REv.).
121. Ranking based on the value of quantity harvested. Statistic from Department of Food
and Agriculture, California Agricultural Statistics Service, reprinted in CALIFORNIA DEPART-
MENT OF FinANcE, 1990 CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACr 91. But because domestic
sugar prices are distorted by sugar program price supports, the true value of California's sugar
production is much less.
122. In 1989 sugar accounted for less than 1% of California's total cash receipts from
farming. IdL at 86.
123. YEARBOOK supra note 85, at 25-27. The ERS notes that because the U.S. sugar pro-
gram stabilizes sugar beet prices, farmers choose to plant sugar over other field crops which
have potentially higher returns but higher risks. Competitive crops with higher estimated re-
turns include: tomatoes, alfalfa, beans, cotton and safflower. Id at 23.
124. U.S. DEPARTmENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 20.
125. Id
126. LANDELL MILLs (1990), supra note 32 at 5-43.
127. Sugar is a labor intensive industry and factors such as high priced U.S. labor and
transportation contribute to the U.S. cost disadvantage. See id at 20.
128. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 17 (statement of Rep. Daniel K. Akaka citing
a U.S. Dep't of Agriculture study).
129. Id at 16 (Statement of Rep. Jerry Huckaby).
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can Sugarbeet Grower's Association, claims a two cent reduction in the
support price would cost beet growers 100 dollars per acre. 130 Florida
cane growers would lose sixty million dollars with a two cent reduction
in the support price, according to Dalton Yancy, President of the Florida
Sugar Cane League and Rio Grande Valley Sugar Grower's Inc.131 But
such calculations are made under the assumption that if the U.S. were to
reduce its level of support, other countries would still maintain their pro-
tective sugar policies. In light of recent trade negotiations calling for
multilateral reductions in agricultural support and protection, it is un-
likely that any U.S. move will be unilateral.1 32 A recent study concluded
that U.S. sugar producers would be able to maintain their present output
levels if all countries created a true world market by eliminating their
sugar price supports and import barriers.13 3 Thus, if GATT negotiations
are successful in reducing sugar subsidies multilaterally, the continued
viability of U.S. producers should not be at risk.
Opponents of sugar import restrictions and price supports argue
that such protectionism actually takes jobs away from U.S. workers.
134
Because artificially high sugar prices result in elevated production costs
for U.S. manufacturers of sugar-containing products, opponents claim
that bulk sugar buyers 35 are moving their factories abroad to take ad-
vantage of world-priced sugar. 36 Along with the factories go domestic
jobs in sugar-using industries. The limited U.S. sugar re-export pro-
gram,' 37 which allows entry by license of certain quota-exempt sugar
provided that sugar is re-exported, 38 has apparently been an insufficient
130. Cited in Gugliotta, supra note 44, at A4.
131. Id.
132. The most recent U.S. proposal in the Uruguay Round called for reductions of U.S.
and EC sugar support by equal percentages. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1202 (Aug. 14, 1991).
For a discussion of the U.S. sugar program as a bargaining chip in the Uruguay Round of
GATT multilateral trade negotiations, see also infra notes 236-60 and accompanying text.
133. LANDELL MILLS (1990), supra note 32, at 5-42, 5-43. The study noted that the big
losers would be the "very high cost producers," i.e., Japan, the U.S.S.R., and China. Id
134. See Nathanael Greene, STATES NEWS SERVICE, July 24, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, SNS File, at *3.
135. Candy manufacturers are among the biggest volume industrial sugar users.
136. In Congressional testimony, E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., a confectionery manufacturer,
stated that U.S. sugar policy is harming the company's competitiveness in the global confec-
tionery market to such an extent that it may be forced to move its 3,500 employee plant out of
the U.S. in order to gain access to world-priced sugar. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at
186.
137. The re-export program was introduced in 1982, shortly after restrictive quotas were
established in response to the adverse consequences of the quotas on domestic refiners and end
users of sugar. Proclamation No. 5002, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,269 (1982).
138. The sugar is re-exported in refined form, sugar-containing products or for production
of non-food polyhydric alcohols. The refined sugar re-export program i,: governed by 7 C.F.R.
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solution. High production costs place foreign competitors at a distinct
advantage in the domestic marketplace.1 39 In addition, many U.S. refin-
eries have closed in the period since the program began to limit imports
of raw sugar to be refined."4 Opponents of the sugar program also point
to the fact that an elimination of restrictions on raw sugar imports would
create jobs in sugar ports of entry and in sugar-user industries, as a result
of increased sales due to lower prices.' 4 '
Not even all farmers support current sugar policy. Many non-sugar
farmers oppose the inequities of the sugar program and have urged Con-
gress to bring sugar back in line with other farm programs. 4 In 1987
the individual sugarcane and sugar beet producer received an average
subsidy of between 40,000 dollars and 60,000 dollars, while the average
wheat farmer received a subsidy of only 5,600 dollars. 43 Some claim
sugar beet and sugarcane producer profits are as high as ten times those
for corn, soybeans, and wheat, creating an elite among farmers.'"
Higher relative profits have induced more farmers to grow more sugar-
cane and beets.'45 In some states, the financial advantage the program
provides sugar beet farmers has allowed them to take land resources
away from farmers of other commodities.", The Chicago Tribune re-
cently reported that midwest wheat farmers are finding it difficult to re-
sist buy-out efforts by sugar farmers.'47 Still, sugar beet and sugarcane
producers insist that without a level of support significantly higher than
those of non-sugar farmers, they would be unable to compete with subsi-
dized sugar from other countries.' 48
§§ 6.100-6.113 (1991); the sugar-containing products program by 7 C.F.R. §§ 1530.200-
1530.214 (1991); and the polyhydric alcohol program by 7 C.F.R. §§ 1530.300-1530-310
(1991).
139. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 150 (statement of Gerald G. Garbacz, Execu-
tive Vice President, W.R. Grace & Co.).
140. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 40.
141. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 143 (statement of Michael Becker, Director of
Research, Citizens for a Sound Economy).
142. A group of wheat, soybean and corn farmers calling themselves "Fair Farm Policy"
have vocally opposed what they consider unfair favoritism granted sugar farmers. See Hear-
ings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 101 (statement by Owen Gustafson, Member, Steering Com-
mittee, Fair Farm Policy).
143. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 41.
144. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 101 (statement by Owen Gustafson, Member
Steering Committee Fair Farm Policy).
145. For example, over the period between 1985 and 1989 beet acreage in Minnesota in-
creased 23% from 278,000 to 342000 acres. IL
146. Congress Votes to Keep Sugar Program As Is, CHICAGO TRIB., July 25, 1990, at C3.
147. L Sugar beet farmers, particularly in the upper midwest region, are organized into
cooperatives, which precludes other farmers from gaining access to their lands.
148. Id
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Although sugar producers receive short-term windfall gains from
high sugar subsidies, they may be supporting the instrument of their own
demise as the high price policy erodes sugar's share of the U.S. sweetener
market. 49 High fructose corn syrup (HFCS), a corn derivative, has al-
ready significantly displaced sugar as a sweetener in many industries,
150
most notably the beverage industry. 151 "The corn farmers, corn syrup
manufacturers, and companies that produce high intensity noncaloric
sweeteners such as aspartame and saccharin'52 are also among the benefi-
ciaries of the sugar program.1 53 Producers of such alternative sweeteners
can increase the prices of their products according to the market price
for sugar,15 4 resulting in unusually high profit margins.'" Thus these
unintended beneficiaries, not even within the class of those whom the
sugar program was intended to benefit, have become active supporters of
the sugar program.
156
Proponents of sugar policy reform argue that an elimination or re-
duction of sugar price supports would not significantly harm corn farm-
ers for several reasons. First, only a very small percentage of U.S. annual
corn production goes into HFCS. 157 Thus, HFCS usage has little effect
on corn market prices, which are set largely by the international feed
market where the great bulk of corn production is sold. Second, because
the U.S. boasts the lowest cost HFCS production in the world,'58 HFCS
prices would remain competitive with sugar prices even if the U.S. sugar
price were reduced by six cents per pound. 159 Finally, although a de-
crease in sweetener price levels may result in a lower profit per unit of
149. STuRcss, supra note 17, at 40.
150. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 11, noting that since the
mid-1970s HFCS has captured markets traditionally held by sugar. In 1985, corn sweetener
consumption (including HFCS, glucose and dextrose) was greater than sugar consumption.
151. Id
152. Id at 16 (noting that the dramatic increase in low calorie sweetener use is not neces-
sarily a result of the high sugar support price but may be a reflection of increasingly calorie
conscious consumers).
153. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 5.
154. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 12 (noting that corn refiners
can price HFCS according to the price of sugar). See also STURGISS, supra note 17, at 64.
155. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 12-13 (noting that the U.S.
sugar program guarantees HFCS producers a minimum price).
156. The corn industry lobbies heavily in support of the sugar program.
157. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 11. The corn refining industry
accounts for less than 5% of total U.S. corn production. Id. at 12.
158. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 148 (statement of Michael Becker, Director of
Research, Citizens for a Sound Economy) (citing Study by the Alexandria, Va,, consulting firm
of Abel, Daft & Early).
159. Id at 17 (statement of Rep. Daniel K. Alaka).
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HFCS sold,"6 lower prices may actually increase HFCS consumption"6
and result in higher overall profits for HFCS manufacturers.16  Thus,
HFCS does not appear in danger of losing its market.
Furthermore, corn sweetener consumption would increase substan-
tially if, by opening its sugar market, the U.S. could lead other countries
to do the same,'63 resulting in a truly open world market.'" The Chair-
man of the Archer Daniels Midland Company postulates that in a com-
pletely free world market HFCS sales would double. 65 Thus, although
corn farmers generally oppose any change in U.S. sugar policy, their in-
terests would not be significantly harmed by a reduction in the sugar
support price.
B. The Costs of the "No Cost" Policy: Consumers Pay the Price
Although the program has no budgetary cost, the price paid by
American consumers is high. In September 1991, the world price for
sugar was approximately nine cents per pound while the U.S. consumer
paid about twenty two cents.'66 A 1988 Commerce Department calcula-
tion indicated that during 1982-85, sugar cost U.S. consumers an average
of 3.7 billion dollars per year more than it would have cost at the world
market price.'6 Because the present world market is a residual mar-
ket, 6 ' world prices are lower than they would be in a completely open
market. But according to Commerce Department estimates, even at a
world sugar price determined by a true world sugar market, the differ-
ence between that world price and the domestic U.S. price would cost
U.S. consumers approximately 1.9 billion dollars annually. 69 A one cent
per pound sugar price reduction could save U.S. consumers 300 million
160. Id at 148 (statement of Michael Becker, Director of Research, Citizens for a Sound
Ecomony).
161. Id
162. This is assuming low production costs would allow HFCS prices to remain lower than
sugar prices.
163. LANDELL MILLs (1990), supra note 32, at 5-42. See also Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra
note 12, at 104 (statement of Owen Gustafson).
164. According to a 1990 study, "[t]he world sweetener sector is possibly the most dis-
torted of the agricultural markets affected by government intervention." LANDELL MILLS
(1990), supra note 32, at 5-42.
165. Quoted in INsiGHT MAGAZINE, Feb. 19, 1990.
166. Sugar prices based on September 1991 New York No. 11 and 14 contracts. Note that
the world price is the result of a residual market, see supra note 14, thus we can assume that in
a true world market the price would be slightly higher.
167. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 5.
168. See supra note 14 for explanation of the residual world market for sugar.
169. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 10.
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dollars per year, according to one estimate. 170
High sugar prices have a disproportionate effect on low income
households. Because so many food items contain sugar, the sugar pro-
gram is similar to a regressive sales tax, taking a higher percent of
smaller incomes. 171 One consumer advocate concluded that the sugar
program results in the equivalent of a 50 dollar annual tax on a family of
four.172 Redistribution of wealth from lower income families to farmers
is another indirect effect of the sugar program.
In addition, the sugar program results in losses to the U.S. economy
as a whole, due to misallocation of resources.1 73 Overvalued sugar con-
sumes a distorted percentage of the budgets of both American consumers
and industrial sugar-users. U.S. sugar producers themselves employ
higher cost resources (i.e. labor and land costs) than do more efficient
world producers. 74 Between 1982 and 1988, the net loss to the U.S.
economy resulting from the sugar program was estimated to be 780 mil-
lion dollars per year. 175 For every dollar transferred to U.S. sugar pro-
ducers, U.S. consumers pay 2.56 to 2.62 dollars. 176 The fact indicates
that the present policy is a highly inefficient means of achieving its stated
goal of domestic producer support.
Those in favor of the present program argue it is a source of govern-
ment revenue from import duties and loan repayments. 177 Without the
program, they claim, the government would have to make more defi-
ciency payments to farmers. 178 They maintain that even in the event of a
reduction of sugar price supports, sugar users would not pass their in-
creased savings on to the consumers.1 79 But a 1988 Commerce Depart-
ment report notes that considerable research has failed to substantiate
this "rachet effect."' 80 Competitive forces in the market should necessar-
ily drive prices down for sugar containing goods following a decrease in
170. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 146 (testimony of Michael Becker).
171. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 5.
172. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 146 (statement of Michael Becker).
173. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 33.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 33.
176. Id. at 37-38. Note that this is partly because consumers are paying higher prices for
all sweeteners due to the high sugar price.
177. Madison, supra note 1, at 1717.
178. Id.
179. Id. They argue that when input prices increase, manufacturers are quick to increase
the price of their products, but when input prices decline, manufacturers are loath to lower
product prices. This has been dubbed the "rachet effect."
180. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 20, at 6.
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the price of sugar. Any nominal "revenues" generated by the sugar pro-
gram should be outweighed by the resulting consumer savings.
M. INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS
A. Sugar Policy as Trade Policy
1. The GATT
Because the United States is a contracting party""1 to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 12 its trade policies are gov-
erned by GATT rules. 83 Until recently there were few successful ef-
forts'84 in applying GATT rules to agriculture.' In fact, the
agricultural sector was partially exempted from some GATT rules. 86 In
1986, however, the GATT members resolved to negotiate new rules to
reduce support and protection of agriculture within the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations.
1 8 7
An understanding of the general framework of the GATT and its
role in multilateral trade negotiations is important in assessing the im-
pact of the U.S. sugar program within the context of U.S. trade relations.
The GATT was adopted in 1947 as a temporary measure to liberalize
181. Because the law at the time did not authorize the President to enter into an agreement
for an organization without congressional approval, but only allowed Presidential agreements
to reduce tariffs and other restrictions on trade, U.S. negotiators created the general GATT
clauses to avoid the suggestion of an organization and multilateral decisions under the GATT
are taken by the 'CONTRACTING PARTIES' acting jointly and not by an organization.
JOHN H1 JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 12 (1990); General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXV, 61 Stat. A3, A7, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 194 [hereinafter
GATr]; 4 BISD (1969); (contracting parties are expressed in capital letters when acting
jointly).
182. The United States became one of the 23 original Contracting Parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on October 30, 1947. The GATT is binding on the United
States as a matter of international law; however, as an executive agreement it was never ratified
by Congress and therefore does not have the status of domestic law. See John H1 Jackson, The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in US Domestic Law, 66 MicH. L REv. 249 (1967).
183. Complete text in force as of March 1, 1969 is reprinted in General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 4 BISD 1-76 (1969).
184. See, eg., United States Import Restrictions on Dairy Products, BISD (1st Supp.) 31-33
(1954) [hereinafter Netherlands Case].
185. This was because during the 1970s and early 1980s many countries, especially the U.S.
and members of the EC attempted to protect their farmers from the effects of falling world
prices using import duties and quotas. LANDELL MILLS (1990), supra note 32, at 3-1. As a
result, their votes led GATT panels to eviscerate the few rules applicable to agriculture.
186. For example, Article XI:2 partially exempts agriculture from the general ban on
quantitative prohibitions and restrictions, and Article XVI:3 provides less stringent rules for
export subsidies on "primary products" than on other products. See GAIT arts. XI:2, XVI:3.
187. Punta del Este Declaration, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986). See also LANDELL MILLS (1990),
supra note 32, at 3-2.
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world trade pending the creation of the International Trade Organizaion
(ITO), which would oversee and harmonize post-war international trade
relations."'8 When Congress failed to ratify the ITO charter,1"9 the
GATT was renewed every three years until it was made a permanent
organization in 1955.190 With 101 contracting parties, 191 accounting for
eighty percent of world trade, 192 the GATT is a major forum for world
trade policymaking.
As an organization, the GATT monitors trade flows and policies,
sponsors multilateral trade negotiation, and hosts dispute resolution pro-
ceedings. 193 The GATT organization is administered by a Secretariat
which acts on behalf of members and the Council of Representatives.
Although several clauses of the GATT agreement call for "joint action"
of the Contracting Parties, in practice GATI business is carried out
through committees, working parties, panels and other bodies.
194
The GATT agreement itself, which includes the original text as
amended, protocols, and the tariff schedules of each member country, is
a legal document intended to regulate trade policy.'95 The GATT goal,
as stated in the agreement's preamble, is to "raise living standards
through reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce."'
196
Although GATT rules generally prohibit both import quotas and
export subsidies, 197 agricultural products come within the many excep-
tions and waivers1 98 which cloud the free trade goals proclaimed in the
188. The GATT and the ITO were originally intended to reduce the. possibility of interna-
tional trade wars like those provoked by the Tariff Act of 1930, (popularly known as the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff). See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT (1969) [hereinafter WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATr].
189. The President submitted the ITO draft charter to Congress in 1948 but the organiza-
tion never came into being because Congress failed to approve it, and in 1951 the President
announced he would no longer seek approval. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT Sys-
TEM, supra note 181, at 12.
190. d at 16.
191. As of January 1991, in addition to the 101 signatory countries, 29 were conforming to
GATT rules on a de facto basis.
192. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATr NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE
POLICY at xx (1987) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE].
193. Id.
194. See WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT, supra note 188, Chs. 6, 7 (1969).
195. See GAIT, supra note 181 (supp. 1989).
196. Id. Four key principles are stated in the agreement: 1) reduction of trade barriers and
elimination of quotas; 2) non-discriminatory international trade policy; 3) permanent tariff
concessions and; 4) peaceful settlement of trade conflict through consultation.
197. See GATT, arts. XI, XVI.
198. There have been over 200 waivers granted since 1947.
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GATT agreement. 199 Article XI:1 of the GATT specifically prohibits
member countries from placing quantitative restrictions on imports from
or exports to other contracting parties.'c But Article XI:2 provides ex-
ceptions for agricultural products, notably Article XI:2(c)(i)'s exception
for import restrictions that are necessary to enforce restrictions on the
quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be produced or mar-
keted. Article XVII generally prohibits export subsidies on most indus-
trial products if the subsidy results in the sale of the product for export at
a price lower than the comparable domestic price of the product. 202 Ar-
ticle XXV:5 permits the Contracting Parties, by a two-thirds majority
vote, to waive GATT obligations. Under this authority, in 1955 the U.S.
was granted a "waiver"2 3 for actions under Section 22,2°( including im-
port quotas or fees, necessary to sustain domestic farm supports.205 No
other trade category is granted such special treatment under the GATT.
Because the GATT agreement provides no enforcement mechanism
other than authorized retaliation,2°s compliance depends largely on com-
ity and fear of unilateral retaliation 0 7 from other member states. Other-
wise, members are encouraged to, and commonly do, use the GATT
rules to guide dispute resolution among themselves.2 °8 Member com-
plaints that are not resolved through consultations are submitted to a
panel of third party representatives for a ruling.209 Such a ruling is not
legally binding until approved unanimously by the GATT Council.
199. The general waiver for U.S. agriculture products was implemented under GATT arti-
cle XXV to protect domestic farmers as explained supra note 184. See also Chuck Freadhoft,
Farm Trade: Ancient, Arcane and Agonizing, INvEsTOR's DAILY, Nov. 30, 1990, at 1.
200. GATT art. XI:l.
201. Id.
202. Thus, article XVI generally prohibits dumping.
203. GATT (March 5, 1955 decision of contracting parties), BISD (3d Supp.) 32-38 (1956)
[hereinafter Waiver]. The decision waived U.S. obligations under articles H and XI of the
GATT to the extent necessary to allow the U.S. to take action under Section 22. The U.S.
requested the waiver in order to avoid any conflict between its GATT obligations and Section
22 which provides that "no trade agreement or other international agreement heretofore or
hereafter entered into by the United States shall be applied in a manner inconsistent with the
Section."
204. 7 U.S.C. § 624.
205. In the 1950s and 60s the EC and Japan also devised ways to impose import restric-
tions by circumventing GAIT rules. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 192, at
79.
206. See GAIT, supra note 181, at Art. XXm:2. The only instance of GATT authorized
retaliation was the Netherlands case against U.S. dairy quotas. See supra note 184.
207. See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411, (amended 1988).
208. JACKSON, supra note 181, at 23.
209. UNDERSTANDING REGARDING NOTIFICATION, CONSULTATION, ON DISPUTE SET-
TLEMENT AND SURVEILLANCE. BISD (26th Supp.) 210-11 (1979).
1992]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Thus, even the losing party in a dispute can block a ruling against it.210
Although even unanimously adopted rulings are not enforceable by the
organization itself, the threat of unilateral retaliation by an injured party
is sometimes enough to dissuade another country from taking a particu-
lar action.21  As one International Trade Commission study concluded,
"When good faith compliance to GATT rules fails, it is the threat of
retaliation, not the GATT dispute settlement process, that looms as the
main restraint to abuse.
'212
2. Australia Challenges U.S. Sugar Policy in the GATT
In 1988 Australia moved to establish a panel to examine the consis-
tency of U.S. sugar import policy with the provisions of the GATT."'
According to Australian Minister for Trade Negotiations Newl Blewett,
the case was brought as a result of three major Australian concerns:
1) shrinking U.S. import quotas214 and their direct effect on world sugar
exporters; 2) decreasing world sugar prices resulting from the glut of
world sugar production banned from U.S. markets; and 3) the possibility
that the U.S. may become a sugar exporter.215 In its case before the
GATT,2 1 6 Australia argued that the U.S. headnote quota was a restric-
tion on imports prohibited by Article XI: 1 and not fitting within the spe-
cific exceptions provided in Articles XI:2, II:l(b) and 7, XII, XIX, XX
or XXV. The U.S. argued that the headnote quota was authorized under
a note attached to tariff concessions made by the U.S. during GATT
rounds in Annecy (1949) and Torquay (1951) and was further contained
in GATT schedule XX (U.S.) as a valid "term, condition, or qualifica-
tion," as permitted under Article 11:1(b). The panel concluded that U.S.
import quotas violated Article XI:l of the GATT agreement which pro-
hibits quantitative restrictions on trade.21 7 The panel report, adopted
210. Id.
211. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRI-
TION & FORESTRY, 99TH CONG. 2D SEss., AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT: TOWARD TIlE
NEXT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 5 (1986).
212. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GATT AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS
(1985).
213. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 47.
214. Australian exports to the U.S. have fallen from 811,000 tons in 1981 to 137,700 tons
in 1990-91. Australia Criticizes US., 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1518 (Oct. 3, 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Australia Criticizes].
215. Id. Neal Blewett estimated the annual cost of U.S. policy to Australia is between
A$123 million and A$313 million.
216. See GATT Panel Report (1989), supra note 3, at 334-36.
217. See GATT Panel Report (1989), supra note 3, at 341.
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unanimously by the GATT Council on June 22, 1989,18' requested that
the U.S. terminate or modify its sugar import quotas.1 9
The GATT ruling did not find that the entire U.S. domestic sugar
price support system violated the agreement.? 0 Only the administration
of absolute import quota under the tariff headnote authority was found
objectionable."2 The panel determined that the U.S. should not be per-
mitted to impose an otherwise GATT-illegal quota as part of a tarifl2
concession conditioned on, qualified by, or granted under the headnote
authority.
223
In response, on September 13, 1990, President Bush announced a
new two-tier tariff-rate quota system 224 which he claimed would bring
U.S. sugar policy into conformity with GATT law. 25 Implemented Oc-
tober 1, 1990, the new proportedly GATT-consistent system leaves the
domestic price support and "no-cost" elements of the U.S. sugar pro-
gram intact. The amount of sugar entering the U.S. will not increase?2
6
under the new tariff quota system 27 unless the gap between domestic and
foreign sugar prices exceeds sixteen cents per pound. The U.S. Trade
Representative continues to allocate the "first tier" or low-duty import
quota amount on a country-by-country basis228 Australian officials have
218. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 89 (statement of Thomas A. Hammers, Presi-
dent of Sweetener Users Ass'n).
219. GATT Panel Report (1989), supra note 3, at 344.
220. Id.
221. Id. U.S. sugar imports are restricted under the "headnote tariff authority" of Title I
of the TariffAct of 1930 as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act or 1988.
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1204, 102 Stat. 1107, 1148-50. See also Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra
note 12, at 39 (statement of Hon. Julius L. Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative).
222. Tariffs are preferred over quotas because they are more transparent and allow some
price signals from the world market. The impact of quotas cannot be directly determined, and
this difficulty in measuring their protective impact precludes comparisons between countries
and sectors. Furthermore, the protective effect of quotas can vary greatly with changing mar-
ket conditions. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGEr OFFicE, supra note 192, at 24.
223. GATT Panel Report (1989), supra note 3, at 344.
224. Proclamation No. 6179, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (1990). See also Australia Criticizes,
supra note 214, at 1518.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 89-98 for a brief description of the new tariff quota
system. A tariff quota system does not violate article XI:1, which applies only to "prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes and other charges."
226. A separate provision in the 1990 Farm Bill does provide that there shall be marketing
allotments if estimated consumption minus carry-in stocks and production is less than 1.25
million short tons. 1990 Farm Bill, supra note 5, sec. 901, § 206. See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 29-40 for an explanation of the provision.
227. Henry Schacht, U.S Sugar Quotas Under Fire from the GA2T, SAN FRANciSCo
CHRON., Sept. 28, 1990, at C3 (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 89-98 for an explanation of the new two-tier
system.
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justifiably complained that the new U.S. system simply replaces one form
of protection with another.229 Indeed, the new system is basically a
structural modification of the old and has almost exactly the same practi-
cal effect. 23°
3. The EC Challenges U.S. Sugar Policy in the GAT
In September 1988, the EC requested a GATT panel to examine the
validity of U.S. restrictions on sugar and sugar-containing products
under the 1955 waiver231 and under the Headnote Authority.2 32 The
parties agreed to narrow the inquiry to the validity of U.S. import quotas
on sugar-containing products and fees on refined sugar, in order not to
re-address issues covered in the Australian case.233 In February 1990,
the panel found U.S. Section 22 import quotas and fees on refined sugar
permissible pursuant to the 1955 waiver for Section 22 actions.2 34 After
five straight vetoes by the European Community,235 the GATT Council
finally adopted the report in November 1990.
4. Sugar in the Uruguay Round
Agricultural trade policies have presented a major roadblock in the
process of negotiations during the eighth round of GATT-sponsored
multilateral trade negotiation, known as the Uruguay Round.236 The
December 1990 breakdown of talks could seriously impede progress to-
ward global trade liberalization, where GATT rules and procedures have
been the driving force.237 Because the GATT provides one of the few
229. Australia Criticizes, supra note 214, at 1518 (statement of Neal Blewett, Australian
Minister for Trade Negotiations).
230. The major difference is that duties on sugar originating in Canada are bound. All
duties on Canadian goods will be entirely eliminated pursuant to the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement. Canada has been removed from the U.S. table of sugar quota allocations.
231. See Waiver, supra note 203.
232. United States: Restrictions on the importation of sugar and sugar-containing products
applied under the 1955 waiver and under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions,
GATT Doc. L/6631, BISD (37th Supp.) 228 (1990) [hereinafter Restrictions on the Importa-
tion of Sugar]. The panel was convened in response to a complaint by the European Commu-
nity (Ec. See also EC Talking with US. on GA YT Panel Sugar Ruling, REUTERS, July 11,
1990, available in Laxis, Nexis Library, Wires File [hereinafter REUTERS].
233. Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar, supra note 232, at 255.
234. Id. at 262. See also William Dullforce, GAT to Draw up Tighter Rules for Waivers In
the Future, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 1990, § 1, at 3.
235. RE TERS, supra note 232, at *2. The incident is just one example of a parochial
interest getting caught in the cogs of the GATT system.
236. The Uruguay Round was launched September 1986 at Punta del Este. See generally
JACKSON, RESTurURING THE GATT SYSTEM, supra note 181, at 36-41. Negotiations were
officially scheduled to end in December 1990 but have been extended until June 1992.
237. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 192, at ix.
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policy forums in which long-term international goals guide the resolution
of disputes over short-term national policy,"3 the success of GATT
agreements is a key mechanism in avoiding costly and debilitating global
trade wars.239
P Present sugar policy is an aberration from the strong free trade
stance of the U.S. in GATT negotiations. For years the U.S. has pro-
moted an increasingly liberal trading system in both agriculture and in-
dustry.2' The U.S. proposal at the Uruguay Talks was consistent with
this free trade stance. It called for "tariffication," a shift from quotas and
other non-tariff barriers to tariffs,24 followed by a ten year phasing out
or reduction of tariffs and the elimination of subsidies over a five year
period.2 42 Yet the sixteen cent per pound second tier tariff of the new
quota system did not conform to the Uruguay Round proposal, which
called for a maximum duty not to exceed the average price gap of 10.5
cents during the 1986-88 base period. Thus, despite rhetoric that it is
preferable to try to bring trading partners up to higher standards rather
than lower those standards,243 the U.S. has maintained a protectionist
sugar policy.2' Furthermore, U.S. officials have shown no indication of
any plan to unilaterally phase out tariffs or eliminate subsidies.
The sugar program has been defended as a bargaining chip,245 for
use to induce other countries to eliminate their own protective agricul-
tural policies. 2" In the 1990 Farm Bill debate, the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative claimed that an elimination of sugar price supports, without
238. kd at xx.
239. Id at xx. See also Stuck in the Gooey Politics of Sugar, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 26, 1990, at
C26, which points out the contradiction between U.S. trade policy and the U.S. sugar program
and cites the possibility that higher sugar price supports could cause a trade war.
240. See Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 44 (testimony of Ambassador Julius L
Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative).
241. This provision of the proposal was implemented by President Bush on October 1,
1990. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
242. Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 39 (statement of Ambassador Katz).
243. See Keith AJ. Hay & Andrei Sulzenko, U.S: Trade Policy and 'Reciprocity', 16 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 471 (1982) (citing also the strong commitment to the GAIT of the U.S.).
244. See Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 100. The Sweetener Users Association
calls for immediate reform of the U.S. sugar program as a "poor example to set" in light of the
U.S. free trade stance in GATT negotiations.
245. See CONGRESSIONAL BuDGET OFFICE, supra note 192, at 6, which states "govern-
ments will be most likely to reduce trade barriers when a tangible concession by one country
can be roughly offset by a reciprocal concession from a trading partner."
246. As a result of the EC's significant sugar subsidies, since 1976 the EC has shifted status
from major sugar importer to exporter, accounting for 13% of the sugar sold on the world
market. See STURGISS, supra note 17, at 14. Two GATT panels have studied complaints by
Australia, Cuba, India, Peru, and Brazil regarding EC export refunds for sugar. European
Communities - Refunds on Exports of Sugar, GAT Doec. L/4833, BISD (26th Supp.) 290
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reciprocal concessions from other countries, would be equivalent to "uni-
lateral disarmament"'247 in GATT negotiations. However, it appears that
there will be no unilateral disarmament, as neither the U.S. nor the EC248
will abandon their sugar programs without equivalent concessions from
other countries regarding their own trade distorting policies.249
Even if the multilateral talks produce a workable agreement on agri-
culture, any agreement will require congressional approval.25 ° Under
rules adopted in conjunction with the Uruguay Round, Congress has au-
thorized "fast track negotiating authority" '251 for the GATT proposal.
Under the fast track authority, the President is required to submit an
agreement to Congress for ratification by a specified date. The Presi-
dent's original March 1, 1991 deadline was extended two years252 after
the December 1990 deadlock in GATT negotiations.253 Once received,
Congress must accept or reject the agreement without amendments
within 90 days.254 The deadline can be extended only with the consent of
the President and both Houses.255 Without the fast track authority, any
GATT accord would be open to amendments from all interest groups,
25 6
and subject to termination by indefinite delay in committee, making it all
but impossible for the U.S. to conform with the agreement of the other
GATT members.257 Since December's GATT deadlock, the fast track
authority of Congress was extended until June 1992.2: 8
(1979); European Communities - refunds on exports of sugar - complaint by Brazil, GATT Doc.
L/501 1, BISD 27th Supp. 69 (1980).
247. Gugliotta, supra note 44, at Al.
248. See STEFAN TANGERMANN ET AL, DISHARMONIES IN EC AND U.S. AGRICULTURAL
POLICY MEASURES 19 (1988) (EC demands U.S. concessions).
249. See Gugliotta, supra note 44, at Al; Nancy Dunne, Washington Ready to Abandon
Sugar Quota, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at 5.
250. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2902(d) (amcnded
1990).
251. 19 U.S.C. § 2903.
252. The deadline was extended until June 1, 1993. Id.
253. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Freer World Trade Falls Victim to its Own Success, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at Al.
254. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1)(1990).
255. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b)(1)(B).
256. The San Francisco Chronicle reported that if the fast track authority were not ex-
tended, "every lobby will have the right to seek amendments [to any GATT accord on agricul.
ture] making U.S. conformity with the international community all but impossible."
Johnathan Marshall, Trade Talks Key to Global Economy, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec. 5,
1990, at C-1.
257. Id
258. Telephone interview with Mr. Joseph Papovich, Senior Trade Policy Advisor for Ag-
riculture, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Aug. 1991).
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Although the GATT talks may continue this year, 9 the recent
stand-off on agricultural issues makes prospects for multilateral conces-
sions look increasingly dim. As long as the U.S. aversion to unilateral
reform outweighs the interests of domestic consumers and Third World
sugar producers, the world sugar market will remain one of the most
distorted of all commodity markets.2"
B. Sugar Policy as Foreign Policy
The U.S. sugar import policy has long been an instrument of foreign
policy. "[S]tarv[ing] Castro out of Cuba" '261 is just one example of a for-
eign policy rationale behind a sugar import restriction. After the Span-
ish-American War, Cuban sugar was given a preferred status in the U.S.
market.262 The Sugar Act of 1948 subsequently assigned a dispropor-
tionately large percentage of the U.S. import quota to Cuba.263 As a
result of this preferential treatment, Cuba greatly increased its sugar pro-
duction.2" Following the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Cuban import
quota was dramatically revoked.265 Subsequent amendments to the
Sugar Act266 provided that the import quota of any country with which
the U.S. did not have diplomatic relations should be filled by imports
from other net sugar exporting countries "until such time as that coun-
try's quota might be restored following its return to the free world."2 67
Current law268 prohibits the allocation of a sugar import quota to any
country that has not verified that it does not import any sugar produced
in Cuba for re-export to the U.S.
269
259. Farnsworth, supra note 253, at Al.
260. See Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 42 (testimony of Ambassador Julius L.
Katz).
261. Van Der Pol, Sugar Beet Issue Splits Economy, WEST CENTRAL TIB., Feb. 17, 1990,
at A8.
262. The Convention of Commercial Reciprocity of 1902 gave Cuban sugar a 20% tariff
preferential. HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 31.
263. The Sugar Act of 1948 assigned fixed allocations for domestic producers and the Phil-
lipines and variable quotas for Cuba and other foreign countries. Cuba was granted 98.6% of
the foreign quota, giving the benefit of any increased consumption to Cuba almost exclusively.
In addition, because the Phillipines would not fill its quota for years in the aftermath of the
devastation from the war, Cuba was assigned 95% of its unfilled quota. Id at 37.
264. I d at 31.
265. After mid-July, 1960, Cuba's share of the U.S. market was transferred to other coun-
tries. Id at 38.
266. March 31, 1961 and 1962.
267. Id at 39-40.
268. The Food Security Act of 1985, 99 Stat. 1443 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1446) [hereinaf-
ter 1985 Security Act].
269. 7 U.S.C. § 1446 note. The 1990 Farm Bill, supra note 5, amended section 902(c) of
the Food Security Act of 1985 to require the President to report to Congress: 1) the identity of
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The U.S. has explicitly used sugar as a foreign policy sanction
against Nicaragua. In the 1983/84 crop year, as the anti-U.S. Sandinista
Government consolidated its control over Nicaragua, President Reagan
reallocated all but 6,000 short tons of Nicaragua's U.S. sugar import
quota to El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. 270 Nicaragua then
brought a complaint before a GATT panel2 7 I arguing, inter alia,272 that
the U.S. explanation of the measure in terms of foreign policy considera-
tions violated the fundamental principle, stated in paragraph 7(iii) of the
Ministerial Declaration of November 1982, that no contracting party
should use trade measures to exert pressure for the purpose of solving
non-economic problems.2 73 The U.S. refused to address the Nicaraguan
complaint, stating that because the action was not taken for trade policy
reasons, an attempt to discuss the issue in purely trade terms within the
GATT would be "disingenuous. 2 7 The panel subsequently found that
"the U.S. had failed to carry out its obligations under the General Agree-
ment, ' 275 and suggested "that the contracting parties recommend that
the U.S. promptly allocate to Nicaragua a sugar import quota consistent
with the criteria set out in Article XIII:2. ' 276 The U.S. ignored the
GATT panel ruling until 1990 when democratic elections were held in
Nicaragua and a pro-U.S. government replaced the Sandinista Regime.
At that time Nicaragua's full quota share was finally restored. 277
On November 20, 1965, Southern Rhodesia's sugar import quota
was suspended following a Presidential finding that it would be contrary
to the national interest to continue the quota after that country's unilat-
U.S. quota recipient countries that are net sugar importers; 2) the identity of those net import-
ers that have verified they do not import for re-export to the U.S. any sugar produced in Cuba;
and 3) what measures have been taken against such countries that have re-imported Cuban
sugar to the U.S. See 1990 Farm Bill § 902, 104 Stat. 3359, 3488.
270. Proclamation No. 5104,48 Fed. Reg. 44,057 (1983). The measure left Nicaragua with
about one-tenth of its prior allocation. United States - Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua,
GAIT Doe. L/5607, BISD (31st Supp.) 67, 74 (1984) [hereinafter Imports of Sugar from
Nicaragua].
271. Id.
272. Nicaragua also argued that the U.S. had violated various provi:;ions of articles XI, II,
XIII and Part IV of the GATT. Id at 70-72.
273. Id. at 72.
274. Id.
275. The panel concluded that the U.S. measures against Nicaragua were inconsistant with
the provisions of Article XIII:2, according to which "in applying import restrictions to any
product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as
closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties might be expected to obtain
in the absence of such restrictions..." Id. at 73-74.
276. Id. at 74.
277. Proclamation No. 6120, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,744 (1990).
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eral declaration of independence.27
While trade embargoes as a form of punishment may be justifi-
able,279 they should not be used "against" our allies.2 ° Sugar policy has
become a type of foreign aid which apportions our "good will" among
allies in the form of quota allocations. But the use of sugar policy as a
form of economic assistance is inefficient and often counterproductive.
U.S. sugar policy actually undermines the U.S. foreign policy goal of
assisting Third World economic development."' By restricting U.S.
consumer and sugar user purchases of world market sugar,2 s2 the U.S.
sugar program has reduced demand and diverted supply on the world
sugar market, thus contributing substantially to depressed world market
sugar prices.28 3 Third World sugar producers and others who sell the
bulk of their sugar on the world market have been devastated by low
world prices.2"
Yearly decreases in U.S. quota amounts 8" have contributed to the
collapse of the sugar industry in some of the poorest countries in the
world.2 8 6 The share of the U.S. sugar market granted to importers de-
creased from 45 percent in 1970 to 13 percent in 1990.2s7 The shrinking
U.S. sugar import market deprives these countries of much needed hard
278. The suspension was made permanent by Executive Order No. 11322, issued January
7, 1967. Exec. Order No. 11322, 3 C.F.R. 606 (1966-1970).
279. E-g., article XXI of the GAIT exempts actions a Contracting Party considers neces-
sary to protect certain security interests. But compare Imports of Sugarfrom Nicaragua, supra
note 270, at 72, in which the U.S. embargo in response to its perceived security interest was
ruled in violation of the GAIT.
280. Articles XII:1 and I:1 prohibit discriminatory quotas and embargoes and article
XlII:2(d) requires that allocated quotas be allocated according to the shares supplied during a
representative period. Article XIII:5 makes these rules applicable to tariff quotas.
281. See generally Betty Ruth Fox, Comment, Interaction of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
and US, Domestic Sugar Price Support: A Political Contradiction, 8 MISs. C.L. REV. 197
(1988).
282. See supra Section I B of this Note for an explanation of the closed U.S. sugar market.
283. CONGRESSIONAL BuDGmnT OFMcE, supra note 192, at 83.
284. U.S. sugar quota recipients expressed their concern about the effects of U.S. sugar
policy in a July 9, 1987 letter to Vice President Bush, which stated, "Our national economies
are suffering damage from diminished access to the U.S. sugar market and from the effects of
U.S. policy on the world market." It was signed by the Ambassadors of 20 sugar exporting
countries: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, India, Ecuador Fiji, Ivory Coast,
Malawi, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Madagascar, Swazi-
land, Thailand, Uruguay, Zimbabwe. (letter reprinted in Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12,
at 206-08).
285. See STURGiSS, supra note 17, at 12-13 for country by country quota allotments from
1983 to 1990.
286. See eg., Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 202-03 (comment of Mauritius Sugar
Syndicate).
287. LANDELL MILLS (1990), supra note 32, at 1-40.
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currency.288 Many of the developing countries harmed by the U.S. pol-
icy are recipients of U.S. foreign assistance monies (USAID) and targets
of U.S. Development Assistance Programs. 289 The contradiction be-
tween the U.S. sugar program and the Caribbean Basin Economic Re-
covery Act (CBERA),29 ° successor to the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI), 291 is a stark example of one U.S. policy undermining another.292
Originally, duty-free access for Caribbean Basin countries to the
high priced U.S. sugar market 293 was included in the Caribbean Basin
Initiative as a form of economic assistance to those countries. Section
213(d) of CBERA, provides that all CBI beneficiary countries 294 shall be
afforded duty-free treatment for all imports of sugar, sirups, and molas-
ses in the same manner as provided pursuant to the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) program. 295 Net income transfers from the U.S. to
the CBI countries as a result of quota allocations and duty-free treatment
under CBERA were as high as 250-280 million dollars in 1983.296
Section 213(d)(3), however, authorizes the President to "suspend
the duty-free treatment for all or part of the quantity of sugar, sirups,
and molasses permitted to be entered... if such action is necessary to
288. Big sugar exporters are often also big debtors, particularly among the CBI countries.
See Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 202 (comments of the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate
stating that most of the 39 countries which export sugar to the U.S. under quotas are "poor,
developing countries that depend heavily upon sugar exports to the United States as a source
of revenues to finance their current economic stability and their future economic develop-
ment). See also id at 206-08.
289. USAID sources indicate that the majority of the 39 countries which export sugar to
the United States are recipients of some form of development assistance from the U.S.
290. Pub. L. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384, (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706) [hereinafter
CBERA]. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act was enacted to promote economic
development and facilitate expansion of economic opportunities in the Caribbean Basin region.
291. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was established by the U.S. in 1983 as an eco-
nomic assistance program for developing Caribbean countries. For the current status of the
program, see generally Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
292. See Fox, supra note 281.
293. CBI countries are granted roughly 33% of U.S. sugar quota allotments each year.
The largest share, approximately 17% in 1990/91, goes to the Dominican Republic. SUOAR
AND SWEETENER (1991) supra note 49, at 10.
294. Sugar imported from Dominican Republic, Panqma and Guatemala is treated sepa-
rately. Such sugar is allowed duty-free entry, subject to absolute quotas. CBERA,
§ 213(d)(2).
295. Established in 1970, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was designed to
assist lesser developed countries by granting their exports of manufactured and semi-manufac-
tured goods special tariff-free status. See DAVID H. BLAKE & ROBERT WALTERS, THE POLI-
TICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 37 (2d ed. 1983) for a brief summary of the GSP.
296. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 35.
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protect the price-support program for sugar beets and sugarcane."'29
Even without such suspension, by 1987 Caribbean countries were losing
in net terms as a result of reduced U.S. quota allotments.29
As a major U.S. sugar quota recipient, the Dominican Republic un-
derstands best the ill-effects of diminishing U.S. import levels.299 With
seven million people and an average per capita income of 730 dollars, the
Dominican Republic lost approximately 400,000 jobs in the sugar indus-
try between 1982 and 1988, when the U.S. began its quota policy.-°° Ac-
cording to Georgetown University Economist Gary Hufbauer, "losses in
sugar have totally canceled the benefits of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative."2
30 1
A bill introduced in the House of Representatives in March 19891
would have provided a minimum floor on CBI country import quotas.
The proposed law would have required that, when total U.S. import
quota levels were reduced, CBI quotas would remain fixed at the expense
of non-CBI holders of U.S. quotas.30 3 When the U.S. Administration
declared the bill's preferential nature inconsistent with U.S. trade philos-
ophy and the GATT,3 4 the bill lost momentum and ultimately failed.
In its deliberations over the 1990 Farm Bill, the U.S. Senate recog-
nized the debilitating effect of the U.S. sugar program on Third World
countries. Citing the importance of the U.S. sugar market for the coun-
tries of Latin America, especially in the Caribbean, Central America, and
the Andean regions, the original Senate version of the farm bill included
a provision addressing the issue explicitly. It required the General Ac-
counting Office to report to Congress its recommendations for policies
the U.S. might adopt to improve and enhance developing countries' ac-
cess to world markets and reduce other distortions to world sugar
297. According to the legislative history, section 213(d) was intended to enable the Presi-
dent to protect the sugar price support program. MR. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1987).
298. A July 24, 1990 Christian Science Publishing Society Report stated that sugar exports
from the Caribbean Basin dropped 82% from S544 million in 1981 to S97 million in 1988. In
1988, the cost of U.S. sugar policy to CBI countries was estimated to be S450 million.
STURGISS, supra note 17, at 35.
299. See id.
300. Id
301. Quoted in Peter Passell, Adding up the World Trade Talft- Fail Now Pay Later, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, § 4, at 3.
302. H.R. 1233, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced to the House March 2, 1989 by Sam
Gibbons).
303. Id.
304. STuRGLss, supra note 17, at 46.
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trade.30 5 However, the Conference Committee deleted the Senate
306provision.
In desperation, many sugar-producing countries have turned to
drug crops as a source of much needed export revenue. 307 Although
there are no definite statistics on the extent of drug production in sugar
exporting countries, it is inevitable that such crop substitution will be-
come more pervasive as the U.S. sugar import market shrinks faster than
the U.S. drug market. Thus, while U.S. citizens are victims of drug-
related crime and U.S. taxpayers finance drug interdiction efforts, the
U.S. sugar program is in effect encouraging drug production.30 8
U.S. sugar policy also harms relations with First World allies such
as Australia, whose access to the U.S. sugar market is more limited each
year. °9 Sugar policy does not exist in a vacuum. Animosities developed
as a result of sugar policies adversely affect the U.S. in adl areas of negoti-
ations with its allies. Such restrictive practices, for example, afford our
allies justification for restriction of U.S. access to their markets. 310 As
markets become globalized, the U.S. should not be alienating its trading
partners and allies.
The sugar policy has become an indirect and unintended form of
economic assistance to world sugar importers because of its depressing
effect on world sugar prices. 311 The People's Republic of China and the
former USSR are major beneficiaries of low world sugar prices.312 Japan,
a relatively small sugar importer, added an average of 80-170 million
dollars annually to its balance of payments surplus between 1982 and
1988 as a result of the U.S. sugar policy's impact on world prices.313
Libya, among the highest per capita sugar consumers on the African con-
tinent, buys 100 percent of its sugar on the artificially low-priced world
market.314 Iraq likewise buys more than 95 percent of its sugar at bar-
305. H.R. CONP. REP. No. 916, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 761, 826 (1990), reprinted In 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5286, 5351.
306. Id
307. See Hearings (Feb. 1990), supra note 12, at 148 (testimony of Michael Beckcr, Citizens
for a Sound Economy).
308. 1d
309. See id at 206-08 (letter from sugar exporting allies regarding U.S. sugar policies).
310. Such an argument was made by many countries during the Uruguay Round talks. See
also id, in which sugar exporters state that "[t]he continued operation by the U.S. of such an
anticompetitive system of domestic sugar production weakens support internationally for ef-
forts to bring about market-oriented policies and reduce trade barriers."
311. STURGISS supra note 17, at 34.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. SUGAR AND SWEETENER (1991) supra note 49, at 43.
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gain world prices.3"' Such countries may be considered among the least
desirable beneficiaries of the U.S. sugar program.
IV. STICKY SWEET POLITICS: WHAT KEEPS THE
PROGRAM GOING
Why did Congress vote316 to continue a policy that benefits a small
group of about 12,600 farmers at the expense of so many? The answer
lies, at least in part, in the U.S. political system and the relative power of
interest groups.
317
Several incidents of sugar policymaking illustrate the way political
considerations may outweigh policy goals. In 1977 President Carter au-
thorized a program of direct payments to producers on the basis that the
alternative, a price support system, would be: 1) inconsistent with the
U.S. position in international trade negotiations, '18 and 2) inflationary
and directly contrary to the Administration's stated goals of easing infla-
tion and deregulation in the interest of enhanced competition. 19 None-
theless, shortly thereafter an agreement between the Administration and
Congress allowed for the establishment of a sugar price support program
under the Agricultural Act of 1949.320 During the debate on the 1981
Farm Bill, the Reagan Administration also strongly opposed proposals
for a sugar program, but found it necessary to bargain with Congress in
order to achieve objectives that it considered more important.
321
The sugar alliance is a group with phenomenal political power. Its
membership includes processors, refiners, beet and cane farmers, corn
farmers and wet millers, and a well-organized network of political action
committees (PACs)."z A recent study by the Center for Public Integrity
concluded that sugar PAC contributed 2.6 million dollars to congres-
315. Id.
316. See supra notes 5-6. (Congressional vote to extend sugar price supports).
317. STURGSS, supra note 17, at 41.
318. At the time, the Administration was involved in negotiations regarding the Interna-
tional Sugar Agreement. See also J.B. PENN, The Federal Policy Process in Developing the
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, AGRICULTURAL FOOD POLICY REVIEw 29 (U.S.D.A. ed.,
1980).
319. Vincent A. Mahler, Controlling International Commodity Prices and Suppliesv The
Evolution of U.S. Sugar Policy in FOOD, THE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECON-
OMY: DILEMMAS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 169 (F. Tullis & W. Hollist eds, 1986).
320. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 42. Although a sugar program was not included in the
draft 1977 farm bills, Congressman de la Garza proposed a successful amendment to support
the price of sugar on the final day of House debate.
321. Id
322. Madison, supra note 1, at 1717.
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sional campaign committees between 1985 and 1990.323 These PAC are
continuously lobbying legislators and the Executive Branch to influence
sugar policymaking. 324 The power of congressional subcommittees in the
U.S. political system3 25 allows sugar interests to influence policymaking
by developing relationships with only a few key legislators.326
Skillful vote trading has been key to the past successes of the sugar
lobby.327 In addition, sugar interests have joined the agricultural coali-
tion in lobbying Congress to maintain support for all U.S. farm prod-
ucts.32 Since 1977, the sugar program has been part of the omnibus
farm bill 329 which includes provisions supported by an increasingly wide
coalition of different interest groups.330 When asked what happened to
his sugar reform amendment to the 1990 Farm Bill, Rep. Thomas 3.
Downey responded: "The sugar group did a lot better job of trading for
votes."
331
Consumer groups and others who oppose the sugar program tend to
lack the effectiveness of the farm coalition, due in part to the lack of
transparency of the program. Consumers are essentially unaware of the
sugar program because its costs are very diffuse, affecting a large number
of people to a small degree. 332 The National Bureau of Economic Re-
search concluded in 1988 that, had the sugar program been transparent
and readily comprehensible to an informed citizenry, it could not have
persisted in anything like the form it did.333
V. RECOMMENDATION
The correct approach to the U.S. sugar problem is a policy of inte-
grated domestic and multilateral reform. The U.S. must formulate a do-
323. How Sugar Subsidies Cost Consumers Billions a Year, WALL STREET J., July 29, 1991
at A7.
324. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 40.
325. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 141 (2d ed. 1989).
326. The Subcommittee on Cotton, Rice and Sugar of the House Co3mmittee on Agricul.
ture is the key policymaking body because the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry has no members from any of the major sugar-producing states.
327. STURGISS, supra note 17 at 44.
328. See Greene, supra note 134.
329. Sugar is Title IX of the 1985 and 1990 farm bills.
330. In addition to support programs for such other commodities ws dairy, cotton, rice,
wheat, soybeans, oats, barley, tobacco, peanuts and corn, the Farm Bill includes export subsi-
dies, environmental programs and food assistance programs.
331. Greene, supra note 134, at *2.
332. STURGISS, supra note 17, at 43-44.
333. A.O. KRUEGER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTROLS: AMERICAN SUGAR (Na-




mestic sugar policy that is both fair to U.S. consumers and industrial
sugar users, and compatible with U.S. foreign policy and trade goals.
Implementation of the U.S. proposal in current GATT negotiations,
33"
calling for "tariffication" and subsequent reduction of all import protec-
tion and export subsidies, is the first step toward such a policy.
Several barriers must be overcome in order to bring U.S. domestic
sugar policy into line with U.S. international trade policy. The fact that
farm bill legislation and multilateral trade agreements are debated and
concluded in separate forums poses one such barrier. The vastly diver-
gent interests controlling policy decisions in the separate forums pose a
still greater barrier.33 Even the farm bill coalition, cohesive on the do-
mestic front, is split within the GATT negotiations between those groups
who expect to gain from foreign market access (e.g., wheat and feed
grains), and those who fear losing U.S. import protection (e.g., sugar,
cotton, dairy, peanuts). One consistent and comprehensive policy for
both forums is absolutely essential.
Congress must put its undivided support behind the U.S. position in
the multilateral arena and express a willingness to modify its sugar pro-
gram to comply with multilateral agreements reached between GAT
member countries. In order to put the U.S. proposal in motion, Congress
must set a timetable for increasing the total allocation of foreign sugar
imports.
In addition, a gradual reduction in the domestic sugar loan rate is
necessary to bring U.S. sugar prices more in line with world prices. As
inefficient producers drop out of the market,336 some lost market share
will be recaptured by countries which have been hurt by the U.S. quota
system, 337 and the average cost of domestic production will decline.
Even at significantly lower prices, many U.S. sugar growers and proces-
sors will continue to be profitable.338
The United States must provide the impetus for multilateral reduc-
tion of agricultural protectionism. With the huge U.S. market on the
bargaining table, the U.S. is in a unique position to take a lead that other
334. See Section III A 4 of this Note.
335. The issue is addressed in an April 1990 LANDELL MILLS COMMODITY STUDIEs RE-
PORT which states "[r]eaching an international accord may assuage the United States' interna-
tional partners, but it is not good politics at home." LANDELL MILLS (1990), supra note 32, at
1-43.
336. Some U.S. producers would be removed from the market as a result of a reduced loan
rate according to a statement of the Sweetener User's Association in Hearings (Feb. 1990),
supra note 12, at 98.
337. Id at 105 (statement of Owen Gustafson, Fair Farm Policy).
338. Id at 98 (statement of the Sweetener User's Ass'n).
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countries likely will follow rather than risk U.S. retaliation. The U.S.
Congress must stand behind the U.S. international trade delegation in
reforming U.S. sugar policy.
